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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ALLEN HALLSTROM and 
JOHANNA C. HALLSTROM, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
L. M. BUHLER and 
MONICA BUHLER, his wife, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9730 
The Statement of Facts as set out in the brief of 
the defendant-appellant generally sets out the sit-
uation in this easel subject to some necessary cor-
rections. 
In 1956 one Glen Teeples sold to the defendant-
appellant a farm in Idaho on Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. Subsequently/ in 19581 the defendant-ap-
pellant Buhler sold the farm on contract to William 
Snyder and Irene Louise Snyder/ his wife/ by the 
terms of which contract Snyder agreed to assume 
all of the outstanding obligations against the prop-
erty and agreed to pay Buhler $281641.80 for his 
equity. However/ the payment to Buhler of such 
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sums· included the real estate, as well. as the personal 
property located thereon, as will be noted later in 
this brief. There is some importance to be attached 
to this fact. It is agreed that the contract required 
payments on such equity to be made on the lst day 
of December of each year, starting in 1959, at the 
rate of $2,000.00 per year plus interest. 
Paragraph two of the defendant-appellant's 
Statement of Facts states in very carefully chosen 
words that Buhler, the defendant-appellant, ''needed 
funds and arranged to receive $14,371.88 from the 
plaintiff Hallstrom". (Emphasis added.) As a matter 
of fact, Buhler made contact with the Contract & 
Mortgage Exchange, · which was an organization 
existing at that time functioning, as the name would 
imply, as a contract and mortgage exchange. Buhl-
er contacted one Roland Funk, who was then the 
president and general manager of Contract & Mort-
gage Exchange (Mr. Funk is now deceased) for 
the sole purpose of selling his interest in the con-
tract (in which he was the seller and Snyders were 
the buyers) at a discount to some party for the pur-
pose of obtaining immediate funds. Mr. Roland Funk 
then contacted the plaintiff-respondent Hallstrom 
herein to ascertain ·whether or not he would be 
interested in buying the equitable interest of the 
seller, Buhler, in the contract. 
There was never, at any time, any mention made 
or indicia of any kind, by Buhler, Hallstrom 
or Roland Funk , that Hallstrom would be in-
terested in or would make a loan to Buhler. As a 
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matter of fact, all of the documents involved clearly 
point out that Buhler assigned all of his right, title 
and interest in and to the contract to Hallstrom. But 
here, again, defendant-appellant has confused the 
facts wherein they state that "Hallstrom admits that 
only $19,938.86 of the contract equity was to pass." 
The truth is that Hallstrom purchased, by agreement, 
the contract involving the real estate, but not that 
part of the contract, or the contract itself, in which 
Buhler sold to Snyders the personal property. This 
is important in that appellant Buhler would have the 
Court believe that Hallstrom took only a portion of 
the contract as some sort of security for a loan, which 
is not true. Hallstrom did, in fact, purchase the real 
estate contract on the farm in Idaho. 
Factually, it is agreed that in addition to the 
contract assigned by Buhler, Buhler agreed to guar-
anty that Snyder would perform under the Buhler-
Snyder contract and, further, it is agreed that the 
guaranty by Buhler to Hallstrom took the form of 
and was secured by a mortgage which Buhler gave 
Hallstrom on his home in Salt Lake City, Utah. The 
mortgage unequivocally guaranteed that William 
Snyder and Irene Louise Snyder, his wife, would 
make the payments of the sums which would be 
due and payable to mortgagees (Hallstrom) under 
the said contract and assignment. There was no 
recital or intent between the parties other than that 
if Snyders did not pay the payments due under the 
Buhler-Snyder contract, that Buhler would in fact 
guaranty to do so and backed the guaranty by a 
I!lortgage on his home in Salt Lake City. It is further 
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agreed that the amount of the mortgage given to 
guaranty Snyders' performance was $25,615.96, 
which would be an amount equal to the face value 
of the contract of the real property in Idaho at that 
time, plus the interest which Snyders would be re-
quired to pay over a several year period. 
A pretrial was held on January 10, 1962, and 
judgment was awarded to Hallstrom as prayed, ex-
cept that evidence was introduced at that time as to 
money that Hallstrom had paid out in addition to 
the $14,371.88, together with the money which he 
had received in connection with the farm, and judg-
ment was granted accordingly. Subsequent thereto, 
at the request of Buhler's counsel who was then Mr. 
Jack Darragh of Salt Lake City, Utah, in association 
with a Mr. Duffin of the state of Idaho, and with the 
consent of the Hallstrom's counsel, a second pretrial 
was held for the purpose of clarifying the issues, at 
which time Buhler introduced into evidence several 
documents, including an affidavit sworn to by the 
defendant Buhler purporting to present defendant's 
case (R. 20-42). These documents were accepted into 
evidence, and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decre·e were signed by the Court and filed 
based thereupon. The motions were denied and on 
April16, 1962, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Decree were entered in the case. On or about 
April25, 1962, Buhler's present counsel filed a motion 
to set aside Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decree or, in the alternative, to amend them 
(R. 84), and at that time and for the third time there 
was presented to the pretrial judge all of the facts 
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and all of the information as to how this matter arose 
and the court was fully apprised thereof. Buhler's 
counsel in his argument, again, for the third time, 
presented to the pretrial court the situation most fav-
orable to his client in light of the documents which 
were then on record, and the motion was again de-
nied, and from the judgment of the court defendant-
appellant Buhler makes this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRANSACTION WAS THE SALE. OF A CON-
TRACT EQUITY SECURED BY A MORTGAGE, 
AND WAS NOT A LOAN. 
Referring to Point I of the appellant, Buhler's 
brief that the trial court did not frame an issue 
whether the transaction was in fact a loan or a sale, 
it is clear from the documents concerned in this mat-
ter that there was no question that this was not a 
loan, was never intended to be a loan and that the 
transaction was solely the sale of the equitable in-
terest of Buhler in a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
(R. 50). There is no promissory note involved herein, 
and there is no agreement for return of said contract 
upon any sum being paid to Hallstrom. Buhler had 
no agreement or option to repurchase or reacquire 
the contract fron1 Hallstrom. At the time Hallstrom 
:purchased the contract, it was his intention to hold 
the contract for investment purposes. Subsequent 
events clearly point out that Hallstrom assumed all 
the obliagtions incumbent upon an owner of real 
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property, and was required, even after notice of the 
default of Snyders to Buhler, to pay the mortgage 
payments, pay the taxes, protect the water rights, 
and do all and every act that a contract holder would 
do. 
At no time did the defendant-appellant ever 
seriously contend tha.t this was a loan or that a loan 
had been agreed upon. The documents were placed 
in evidence before the trial court at the pretrials and 
the court clearly and emphatically declared that the 
same was not a loan and that such a defense, in the 
light of all of the facts, was not valid. Factually, Hall-
strom had no conversation of contact with Buhler 
in the preliminary stages, and the only contact with 
Buhler occurred after the Contract & Mortgage Ex-
change had made known to Hallstrom Buhler's offer 
to sell the Buhler-Snyder contract at a discount. As 
a matter of fact, the Contract & Mortgage Exchange 
was a business set up, not for the loan of money as 
a loaning agency (as it's charter will so show), but 
rather it was an agency which brokered contracts 
o.nd mortgages at a discount. This fact was known to 
Buhler. 
Respondent makes no negative contention that 
the courts are reluctant to permit mere form to pre-
vail over substance as set out in the discussion in 
154 A. L. R. 1063, but we fail to see the significance 
o£ defendant-appellant's statement that in the sale 
of a piece of property it is assumed that the buyer 
runs the risks incident to the ownership of the prop-
erty purchased. Counsel cites the case of Britz vs. 
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Kinswater (1960), 87 Ariz. 385, 351 P. 2d 986, and 
three other cases supporting the test of what consti-
·tutes a loan. These cases are totally out of point with 
the matter here under consideration. In all of these 
cases the situation was such that the seller would 
receive money from the buyer, but that when the 
buyer had been satisfied and had received a desig-
nated amount of money from the seller, that he 
would return the contract to the seller. In other 
words, the buyer was merely holding the contract 
as a security for an obligation and in some cases at-
tempting to circumvent the law of usury. The test 
used in these cases to construe the transactions as 
a loan rather than a sale was the fact that the seller 
was to receive the contract back, and that buyer was 
to receive his money in any event, with little or no 
risk, and further that buyer was unfamiliar 
with the property. Such a situation was not true in 
the present case. Mr. Hallstrom purchased the con-
tract from Mr. Buhler without recourse and without 
agreement that it would be returned. He bought it 
with no strings attached. Buhler had no option to 
receive it back. Hallstrom had no obligation or 
privilege of giving the contract back for any desig-
nated amount of money. Hallstrom very carefully 
checked the property and walked over the same 
personally, as well as discussed the matter with 
Snyder and his wife. After so doing, Hallstrom felt 
two things, (1) that Snyder was not a good risk so 
far as paying the contract balance, and (2) that the 
property as such was not a good risk for a purchase, 
even at a discount, so Hallstrom insisted that if he 
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bought the contract he be given some sort of a 
guaranty that the contract balance would be paid 
'off. The guaranty given by Buhler took the form of 
a mortgage on Buhler's home in Salt Lake City. 
Moreover, the cases defining a loan are prac-
tically in full accord that 
" ... lending ,or loaning money or credit is at once 
understood to mean a transaction creating the cus-
tomary relation of borrower and lender, in which 
the money is borrowed for a fixed time and the bor-
rower promises to repay the amount borrowed at a 
stated time in the future with interest at a fixed 
rate." (Bannock County, et al vs. Citizens Bank & 
Trust Co., et al, 53 Ida. 159, 22 P. 2d 674) 
"A loan of money has been defined as a contract by 
which one delivers a sum of money to another and 
the latte,r agrees to return at a future time a sum 
equivalent to that which he borrows." (54 C. J. S. 
654) 
The crux is the promise to pay back the amount bor-
rowed. In the instant case there was no promise by 
Buhler to pay back the money paid him by Hall-
strom, nor was there evidence or any other indicia 
of a loan. 
Hallstrom was to receive the contract face value 
of $19,938,86, plus interest, which was the value of 
the real estate contract for the sale of the farm in 
Idaho. He was to receive the whole amount of that 
contract balance, but was not, nor did his pleadings 
indicate he was entitled to receive that amount per-
taining to the personal property which involved a 
contractual obligation between Snyder and Buhler 
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for personal property and chattels upon the farm. 
Appellant would confuse the facts in an attempt to 
show that Hallstrom was only getting a portion of 
the contract and not all of it, and therefore was tak-
ing the same as a security for a loan. This simply is 
not true. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S MORTGAGE WAS SECURITY FOR A 
GUARANTY, WHICH GUARANTY WAS ABSO-
LUTE AND NOT CONDITIONAL. 
Appellant Buhler claims that no notice was giv-
en of the breach of the principal contract and that 
Hallstrom failed to fix his loss against the principal 
and, therefore, did not comply with conditions prece-
dent to recovery aqainst Buhler. 
Here, appellant is assuming that the guaranty 
herein given was a conditional guaranty, which is 
not so. The guaranty herein given was an absolute 
guaranty, and under the law of absolute guaranty 
the guarantee is not required to give notice (al-
though notice was given in this case) to the guar-
antor o£ the default of the principal. See 38 C. J. S. at 
page 1223, Section 63: 
"In general, in the absence of an express provision, 
the duty of the guarantee to notify the guarantor of 
a default depends upon whether or not the guaranty 
is absolute, the guarantor being usually held en-
titled to notice only when the guaranty is condition-
al or uncertain as to amount and accrual." 
The case on guaranty cited by the appellants, 
Wall vs. Eccles (1922), 61 U 247, 211 Pac. 702, clearly 
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and definitely defines what is an absolute guaranty 
and what is a conditional guaranty, and the duties 
·and obligations of both. Wall vs. Eccles sets out that 
an absolute guaranty is one by which the guarantor 
unconditionally promises payment or performance 
of the principal contract on default of the principal 
debtor or obligor, while a conditional guaranty is 
one which is not enforceable immediately upon the 
default of the principal but under which some con-
tingency must happen or the guarantee must take 
some steps to fix the liability of the guarantor. It 
further holds that if the guaranty is absolute it is 
not necessary to exhaust the remedies against the 
principal debtor before proceeding against the 
guarantor. 
The case of Wall vs. Eccles held the guaranty 
therein to be absolute and involved the purchase of 
certain mining equipment and turns on a letter writ-
ten by Eccles to Col. E. A. Wall in which he sets out 
the terms and conditions and says, further: 
"For your information will state that I will person-
ally guarantee this bill." (P. 253) 
(See also Brown vso Merriott, 97 U. 65, 89 P. 2d 478.) 
In the instant case, as in the Wall vs. Eccles case, 
there were no conditions precedent nor was the 
guaranty conditioned upon any contingency what-
soever, other_ than failure of Snyder to make the 
payments. 
Appellant suggests that the mortgage involved 
is ambiguous. He 9-dmit$ that it guarantees the pay-
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ments due to be made by Snyder, but then states 
that the mortgage does not specify whether Hall-
strom is to be protected before pursuing his remedie$ 
under the assignment or after. As a matter of fact, 
it specifically states as follows (R. 5): 
"This mort,gage is ·given to secure the performance 
by the purchaser of .the terms and conditions of a 
certain contract dated September 16, 1958, by and 
between L. M. Buhler and Monica Buhler, sellers 
therein, and William Snyder and Irene Louise 
Snyder, buyers therein, covering ... which said con-
tract is, concurrently with the execution hereof, be-
ing assigned by said L. M. Buhler and Monica Buhl-
er, his wife, to the above named mortgagees (Allen 
Hallstrom and Johanna C. Hallstrom, his wife). The 
purpose of this mortgage is to ,guarantee to the 
above named mortgagees the payment by William 
Snyder and Irene Louise· Snyder of the sums that 
will be due and payable to the above named mort-
gagees under the said contract and assignment." 
We submit that we know of no way that this 
mortage could have been more specific. It is in no 
way ambiguous, and its specifies that Buhler guar-
antees Snyder's payments. As such, the mortgage is 
not ambiguous and Hallstrom is not required to 
pursue any remedies other than foreclosure of the 
mortgage, since that is the only remedy required of 
him under the assignment and mortgage guaranty. 
Since the law of conditional guaranty is not in-
volved, it is not necessary that such guaranty or 
mortgage specify whether or not Hallstrom is pro-
tected before or after, or that he do any act precedent 
to foreclosure. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ENTERED SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS. 
The trial court correctly entered summary judg-
ment in favor of Hallstrom and against Buhler after 
fully considering the pleadings, facts, and evidence. 
On three separate occasions the appellant Buhler 
submitted to the trial court evidence and arguments 
in favor of his position and even attempted to vary 
the terms of the transaction by parol evidence. 
Buhler argued that the assignment and mortgage 
were ambiguous and offered extrinsic evidence in 
support thereof. Although the court was not bound 
to do so, the court received this parol evidence and 
considered it in framing its Findings, Conclusions 
and Decree, even though at no place in appellant's 
pleadings or evidence did he suggest that the trans-
action was fraudulent, misrepresented or the result 
of a mistake. 
Buhler, in his brief, again attempts to vary the 
terms and c6nditions of the mortgage and assign-
ment by extrinsic and parol evidence to say that 
the mortgage was given to secure a loan, notwith-
standing the fact that the mortgage cites on its face 
that the mortgage was given to secure Snyder's pay-
ments under the contract. The general rule with re-
spect to use of parol evidence is stated in 36 Am. 
Jur. 749, Mortgages, Section 124, as follows: 
"Extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of a 
mortgage is admissable where the instrument is am-
biguous and succeptible of different constructions. 
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It is, however, admissable only in such cases. The 
rule may not be applied and parol evidence is not 
competent for the purpose of varying a written con-
tract expressed in a mortgage, deed of trust in the 
nature of a mortgage, or note secured thereby, by 
showing any understanding prior to, or at the· time 
of, its execution, in the absence of fraud, mis.repre-
sentation, or mistake." 
Absent Buhler's allegations of fraud, misrepresen-
tation or mistake, there existed no genuine issue of 
fact. The only issue which could be raised is whether 
or not the Snyders had performed fully the Buhler-
Snyder contract which had been purchased, by re-
spondent (R. 23). However, this is not an issue since 
the appellant admits in the affidavit of L. M. Buhler 
that the Snyders defaulted by failing to make the 
payments and that they abandoned the property 
(R. 21). Appellant was duly notified of Snyder's de-
fault (R. 21, 34, 35-36). Appellant failed to pay, where-
upon Hallstrom commenced action to foreclose the 
Buhler-Hallstrom mortgage. 
The transactions are simple-( l) Buhler assigned 
the Buhler-Snyder contract to Hallstr0m and guar-
anteed Snyder's payments. (2) As security for the 
guaranty, Buhler gave Hallstrom a mortgage on 
Buhler's home in Oak Hills. The trial court studied 
the documents, the affidavit of Buhler, heard ap-
pellant's arguments at both pretrials, and at a third 
hearing, and considered the parol evidence offered 
by Buhler in support of his position, yet the trial 
court was convinced that there was no loan involved 
and regarded the mortgage as security for the 
guaranty (R. 72, 80). 
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The summary judgment granted by the District 
Court in favor of~ respondent should be upheld by 
this court for the reason that adequate proof was of-
fered by respondent in support of the motion for 
summary judgment and there exists no genuine is-
sue of fact. As was stated by this Court in Dupler vs. 
Yates, 10 U. 2d 251, 351 P. 2d 624, 636: 
"Certainly, if the· summary judgment procedure iS" 
to be effective, it must be held that when adequate 
proof is submitted in support of the motion, the 
pleadings are riot sufficient to raise an issue of 
fact." 
POINT IV 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
DECREE ENTERED BY TRIAL COURT ARE SUP-
PORTED BY PLEADINGS AND PROOF, AND 
SHOULD STAND AS VALID. 
With respect to appellant's contention in Point 
III of appellant's brief that the judgment of the trial 
court was $2,847.48 plus interest in excess of that 
pleaded or proved, the trial court determined at both 
pretrial conferences that respondent was entitled to 
certain specific amounts, and judgment was granted 
accordingly. Respondent did plead in his complaint 
for the recovery of the principal amount owing on 
the Buhler-Hallstrom mortgage ($17,938.36), plus in-
terest ($896.94), costs and $1500.00 attorney's fees. 
Although respondent did not specifically plead the 
amount of $967.50 plus interest paid by respondent 
to John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, or 
the amount o~ $302.02 plus interest paid by respond-
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ent for taxes, or the amount of $1,180.00 plus interest 
paid by Hallstrom to Teeples, respondent did plead 
generally that the court determine the amount owing 
by appellant to respondent and for judgment there-
on and II for such other and further relief in the 
premises as plaintiffs are entitled to and the court 
deems just and proper ... II (R. 3-4). At the hearing 
on appellant's motion for supplemental pretrial or-
der (R. 45), appellant introduced into evidence the 
affidavit of the defendant L. M. Buhler wherein Buh-
ler admitted that Hallstrom had paid Teeples $1,-
180.00, $967.50 to John Hancock Insurance Com-
pany and $302.02 on property taxes (R. 21.) The 
court considered this affidavit in denying appel-
lant's motion and in turn granting judgment against 
Buhler for those amounts paid by respondent, which 
the appellant admitted had been paid (R. 75-76, 80-
81). 
Respondent submits that the appellant cannot 
object to the Findings, Conclusions and Decree on 
those amounts on the basis that they constitute a 
material variance from the original pleading. Re-
spondent submits that the Findings, Conclusions and 
Decree do conform to the pleadings· and proof ad-
duced at the pretrial conferences. That they conform 
to the pleadings is apparent in that respondent 
asked the court for judgment in those amounts the 
court determined were owing, and for such other 
and further relief as the respondent was entitled 
to and was just and proper. That they conform to 
the proof is obvious from the appellant's sworn af-
fidavit which was submitted into evidence by the 
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appellant himself. Moreover, the law does not re-
quire that recovery of every dollar sought be spe-
cifically pleaded. 
Respondent submits that those amounts which 
were not specifically pleaded were nonetheless 
:Put' ·in issue by the appellant at the second pretrial 
conference by the introduction of his affidavit and 
were considered by the court to be in issue by the 
implied -consent of the appellant. 
Rule 54(c) (l) U. R. C. P. states that " ... every 
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even 
if . the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings." 
Although respondent did not demand specifi-
cally relief on the $1,180.00, $967.50 and $302.02 plus 
interest in his pleadings, nor did respondent amend 
his pleadings at the time of the pretrial conference 
to demand specifically those amounts, the appellant 
·was in no way prejudiced thereby, nor was appel-
lant surprised and misled, and the validity of the 
Findings, Conclusions and Decree, in granting the 
respondent those amounts are in no way affected. 
Rule l5(b) U. R. C. P. states: 
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated· in all respects as if they had been raised 
in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings·. 
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the. evidence and to raise these issues may be made 
upon motion of any party at any time, even after 
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judgment; that iailure so to amend does not affect 
the result of the trial of these issues.'' (Emphasis 
added.) 
In construing this section, the Supreme Court 
in the case of Seamo·ns vs. Andersen, 122 U. 497, 252 
J. 2d 209, affirmed a money judgment for an amount 
not specifically pleaded. 
The case involved a prayer for relief by one 
Peterson, a party defendant who cross-claimed 
against the defendant Andersen, and included a 
prayer against Andersen and various other de-
fendants for specific sums of money, and " ... for 
such further relief as the equities of this cause is 
justified." The record revealed that defendant An-
dersen had agreed to pay an additional $117.00 to 
Peterson, Judgment was given to Peterson and An-
dersen appealed contending error on the part of 
the trial court in granting judgment against Ander-
sen for the $117.00 when it was not specifically 
prayed for by the cross-claiming Peterson. The Su-
preme Court upheld the ruling of the trial court 
stating that in view of the record and in view of 
U. R. C. P. lS(b), failure to rully amend the pleading 
was non-prejudicial to the defendant Andersen. See 
also Buehner Block Co. vs. Glezo.s, 6 U. 2d 226, 310 
P. 2d 517. 
That the judgment of court as contended by 
Buhler was $2,847.48, plus interest, in excess of 
pleadings and proof is erroneous. As a matter of 
fact, the amounts prayed for, together with interest 
thereon, plus the amounts admitted by Buhler in his 
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affidavit/ plus interest (R. 20)1 total in excess of the 
amount for which judgment was actually given. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully submits that the 
summary judgment rendered by the District Court 
be sustained on the basis and for the reason that 
there exists in this case no genuine issue of fact. 
Respondent contends that the list of issues proposed 
by appellant in the conclusion of his brief were put 
before the trial court at the retrial conferences and 
subsequent hearing/ and were resolved in favor of 
respondent. In so doing/ the District Court relied 
upon the pleadings and evidence then before it and 
the arguments of counseL and concluded that ap-
pellant had raised no genuine issue of fact which 
should be tried. 
Respondent submits that the summary judg-
ment was correct in law and in fact and requests 
that it be affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JED W. SHIELDS 
WARREN M. WEGGELAND 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs-Respondents 
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